We provide a perturbed evolutionary model of matching on a graph. First, we obtain that maximal matchings are the singleton recurrent classes of the model without perturbations. Then, we apply stochastic stability analysis considering two different error models: the link-error model, where mistakes directly hit links, and the agent-error model, where mistakes hit agents' decisions, and indirectly links. We find that stochastic stability is ineffective for refinement purposes in the link-error model -where all maximal matchings are stochastically stable -while it proves effective in the agent-error model -where all and only maximum matchings are stochastically stable.
Introduction
There is a close relation between graph theory and matching theory. Given a graph, a matching is a set of non-adjacent links on the graph. A maximal matching is a matching such that any added link would be adjacent to an existing link. A classical problem in graph theory concerning matching on a given graph is about finding a maximum matching, which is a matching with the highest number of links (hence, it must be a maximal matching). A variety of algorithms have been developed to solve this problem in polynomial time: among the most famous are the blossom algorithm (Edmonds, 1965) for general graphs, the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm (Ford and Fulkerson, 1956 ) and the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm (Hopcroft and Karp, 1973) for bipartite graphs. Related problems with higher computational complexity (Valiant, 1979 ) concern enumerating or counting all maximum matchings and all maximal matchings. While all the above algorithms constitute centralized mechanisms where local information must be collected and elaborated by a central planner, we propose a decentralized model that proves able to achieve analogous results. In particular, we consider an evolutionary setting where pairs of nodes connected in the graph, that we interpret as agents who can potentially interact together, can choose to realize the link and obtain the benefits from interaction. While this simple dynamics is only able to achieve some maximal matching, interesting results arise when we add a tiny amount of perturbations. More precisely, we consider two different error models, that we call link-error model and agent-error model, and we make use of stochastic stability (Foster and Young, 1990; Young, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993) , which gives the long-run probability of each ✩ The results in this paper partly overlap with those in a manuscript that has previously circulated under the title "Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation". We thank for helpful comments Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, Matthew Jackson, Shachar Kariv, Brian Rogers, Fernando Vega-Redondo, Simon Weidenholzer and Leeat Yariv. matching when the likelihood of a mistake tends to zero. In the link-error model a mistake hits a link, forming or removing it despite agents' choices. In the agent-error model, instead, a mistake hits the choice of a single agent, implying that two mistakes are required to form a link when both agents would prefer not to form it. We find that stochastically stable matchings, i.e., matchings that have a positive long-run probability, coincide with: (i) maximal matchings in the link-error model, (ii) maximum matchings in the agent-error model. These results suggest an approach to find all maximal and maximum matchings that may be of interest to computer scientists. Indeed, computer simulations can be used to calculate the long-run proportion of time spent in each matching when mistake probabilities are tiny: those matchings that are visited a non-negligible proportion of time correspond to maximal matchings in the link-error model and maximum matchings in the agent-error model.
L. Boncinelli, P. Pin / Games and Economic Behavior
Following the seminal contribution of Gale and Shapley (1962) , where the celebrated deferred-acceptance algorithm is provided showing the existence of a stable matching (i.e., a matching such that any pair of mates cannot both be better off by matching together), matching is largely studied in economics in the context of the marriage problem, where agents are divided in two sets, and each agent has a preference order over the potential mates of the other set. Differently from this stream of literature, we consider a general matching problem (sometimes referred to as roommate problem, of which bipartite matching is a special case) and extreme preferences described by an exogenously given graph, where two agents are connected if they can be potential mates, and are not connected otherwise.
Decentralized matching is receiving an increasing attention in economics, starting from Roth and Vande Vate (1990) , where it is shown that the process of allowing pairs of mutually benefiting agents to match together over time converges to a stable matching with probability one. In particular, there is a stream of contributions that make use of stochastic stability: Jackson and Watts (2002) find that all stable matchings are stochastically stable in the marriage problem, and Klaus et al. (2010) obtain the same result in the roommate problem. Both these papers adopt an error model where mistakes affect links rather than agents' choices, with the difference that mistakes cause links to be removed in Jackson and Watts (2002) , and to be formed in Klaus et al. (2010) (see more on this in the discussion of Section 5). Newton and Sawa (2015) consider a large class of mistake models in a variety of matching problems and find a necessary condition for a matching to be stochastically stable, namely being most robust to one-shot deviation.
The arguments in the proofs of the present paper are closely related to those in Boncinelli and Pin (2012) , especially after a line graph transformation is applied, translating links into nodes, and adjacencies between links into links. Beyond the completely different issue (Boncinelli and Pin, 2012 , study the contribution to local public goods by means of the best-shot game applied to networks), we stress that considering links instead of nodes yields substantial differences in the agent-error model, since a link is comprised of two agents, and link formation requires mutual consent while a single agent's will is enough for link removal, which in turn implies that forming a link by mistake can be harder than removing it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the baseline problem of matching on a graph. In Section 3 we provide the unperturbed dynamic model, and a first result on recurrent classes. In Section 4 we analyze the perturbed dynamic model, characterizing stochastically stable matchings for the link-error model and the agent-error model. Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion.
The model
Our notation is mainly based on Jackson and Watts (2002) . Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents. We consider a non-directed network g where the agents in N are the nodes (or vertices). More precisely, g is a set collecting subsets of N of size 2. A subset collecting agents i and j, i = j, is denoted with ij, and is called link ij. We interpret ij ∈ g by saying that agents i and j are connected in g, which means that they can potentially trade together.
A matching m is a subset of g with no adjacent links, i.e., such that if ij ∈ m and k ∈ m, then k = i = and k = j = .
We interpret ij ∈ m by saying that agents i and j trade together. We call trading agents the agents who belong to links in m, and we indicate with N(m) such a set. We denote with M the set of all matchings. We also use the notation m + ij and m − ij to denote, respectively, m ∪ {i, j} and m \ {i, j}.
A maximal matching is a matching with the property that if ij ∈ g and ij / ∈ m, then m + ij is not a matching. In other words, m is a maximal matching if it is not a proper subset of any other matching.
A maximum matching is a matching with the maximum number of links. Of course, a maximum matching is a maximal matching, but the converse is in general false (as illustrated by Fig. 1 ).
Unperturbed dynamics
Time is discrete and denoted with t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. At time t, if the existing matching is m, then every agent i ∈ N(m) earns a payoff equal to 1, and every agent i ∈ N \ N(m) earns a payoff equal to 0.
The matching m at time t + 1 is determined starting from the matching m at time t as follows. One link ij ∈ g is randomly drawn for revision. If ij / ∈ m, then such a link can be formed. If agent i / ∈ N(m), then i will get a payoff of 1 if the link is formed, and a payoff of 0 if he remains unmatched. Thus, he will choose to form the link. If i ∈ N(m), then ik ∈ m for some k ∈ N, and i will get a payoff of 1 both if link ik is severed and link ij is formed, and if link ij is not formed and link ik remains in place. We suppose that the decision to sever a link requires a small cost c > 0 to be paid. Therefore, in this case agent i will choose not to form link ij. A similar analysis applies to agent j. The link ij will be formed if and only if both i and j choose to form it (that is, mutual consent is needed for link creation). If ij ∈ m, then such a link can in principle be removed, if at least one between i and j is intended to do so (that is, mutual consent is needed for link maintenance). Since both i ∈ N(m) and j ∈ N(m), each of them earns 1 if link ij is not removed, while earning −c if link ij is intentionally removed. Therefore, both i and j will never choose to sever link ij.
We stress that no existing link will ever be removed, neither directly nor indirectly as the result of link creation.
We consider the Markov chain (M, T ), where M is the state space (i.e., the set of all matchings) and T is the resulting transition matrix. In particular, T mm gives the probability that m is reached at time t + 1 if m is the matching at time t.
A subset C ⊆ M is a recurrent class of (M, T ) if: (i) for every m ∈ C and m ∈ M \ C , we have that T mm = 0, and (ii) C is a minimal (non-empty) set with respect to the property in (i). The following lemma characterizes the recurrent classes of (M, T ).
Lemma 1. C is a recurrent class of (M, T ) if and only if C = {m} with m a maximal matching.
Proof. For the if statement. Since existing links are never removed, the only possibility to leave a matching is if an additional link is created, but this is impossible by definition if m is a maximal matching. Hence, property (i) holds. Since {m} is a singleton, it is clearly minimal with respect to such property, and so property (ii) holds as well.
For the only if statement. If m is not a maximal matching, then there exists a link ij such that m + ij ∈ M. This implies that both i / ∈ N(m) and j / ∈ N(m). Hence, if link ij is drawn at time t, it will be created since profitable for both i and j. Now, either m + ij is a maximal matching, or the above reasoning can be applied again. Since the state space is finite, a maximal matching is hence reachable with positive probability in a finite number of times, which completes the proof. 2
Perturbed dynamics
We apply stochastic stability to check whether our predictions can be refined beyond maximal matchings. We take into consideration two different error models. We call the first one link-error model. At every time, with probability 1 − the result of the revision of the randomly drawn link ij is exactly the same as in the unperturbed dynamics.
With probability , instead, the revision of link ij gives the opposite result.
We also take into consideration another error model, which we call agent-error model. At every time, with probability 1 − the choice of agent i is exactly the same as in the unperturbed dynamics. With probability , instead, the choice of agent i is the opposite. The same occurs to agent j, in an independent manner. The substantial difference between the two error models concerns the case of link creation. The formation of a new link on which there is not mutual consent always requires one mistake (i.e., it occurs with probability of order ) in the link-error model, while in the agent-error model it requires one mistake if only one agent is not willing to create the link, and two mistakes (i.e., it occurs with probability of order 2 ) if both agents are not willing to create the link.
Both error models yield, for every > 0, a Markov chain that is irreducible, i.e., has a unique recurrent class, and aperiodic, i.e., there exists a time after which the system can be at any state with positive probability. This in turn implies that there exists a unique invariant distribution that describes both the fraction of time spent and the probability to be exactly on each state after a very long time has elapsed, irrespectively of the initial state. The limit of the invariant distribution for going to 0 is shown to exist (Young, 1993) , and the states that receive positive probability in such a limit distribution are called stochastically stable states.
We invite the reader who is interested in a formal exposition of perturbed Markov chain theory to consult Young (1993) and Ellison (2000) , while in the following we simply make use of the resistance function r : We rely on the techniques and results illustrated in Young (1993) and Young (1998) , as they provide a relatively easy way to identify which states are stochastically stable. More precisely, we restrict attention to maximal matchings, since there are no other recurrent states by virtue of Lemma 1, and for any pair (m, m ) of maximal matchings we define r * (m, m ) as the minimum sum of the resistances between matchings over any path starting in m and ending in m . Then, for any maximal matching m, we define an m-tree as a tree having root at m and all maximal matchings as nodes. The resistance of an m-tree is defined as the sum of the r * resistances of its edges. Finally, the stochastic potential of m is defined as the minimum resistance over all trees rooted at m.
A state m is stochastically stable if and only if m has minimum stochastic potential in the set of maximal matchings. Intuitively, stochastic stability selects those states that are easiest to reach from other states, with "easiest" interpreted as requiring the fewest mistakes (as measured by the stochastic potential).
Our results are stated in the following two propositions. As a comment to Proposition 2, we remark that stochastic stability, which is typically employed as a refinement criterion in evolutionary game theory, has no bite in our setting if the link-error model is adopted, since all matchings that belong to recurrent classes of the unperturbed dynamics turn out to be stochastically stable.
The efficacy of stochastic stability for refinement purposes is restored if the agent-error model is adopted, as shown in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. In the agent-error model, a matching is stochastically stable if and only if it is a maximum matching.
Proof. We take a pair of maximal matchings (m, m ). ∈ m 1 is drawn for revision and formed. In this other case, if only one mistake is made, then only one agent between i and j is trading at m 1 , which means that one link is removed and hence |m \ m | gets reduced at most by 1; if two mistakes are made, then both i and j are trading at m 1 , which means that two links are removed and hence |m \ m | gets reduced at most by 2. In any case, the reduction in |m \ m | cannot exceed the number of mistakes.
Therefore:
We are ready to prove that a stochastically stable matching is a maximum matching. We proceed by showing that a maximal matching m that is not a maximum matching cannot be stochastically stable. Since m is not a maximum matching, we can find a maximal matching m such that |m | > |m|. Take any m-tree and consider the path in the tree from m to m, say (m , m 1 , . . . , m i , . . . , m k , m). By (1), the sum of resistances over this path is |m | − |m
We now consider the m -tree obtained from the m-tree by reversing the path from m to m. Again by (1), the sum of resistances over this reversed path is |m| − |m
Taking the difference between the above sums of resistances over the two paths, we obtain that the m -tree has a resistance which is equal to the resistance of the m-tree +|m| − |m |. Since |m | > |m|, we can conclude that for any m-tree we can find an m -tree with a lower overall resistance, and hence the stochastic potential of m is lower than the stochastic potential of m. Therefore, m cannot be stochastically stable. We now prove that a maximum matching is stochastically stable. Since at least one stochastically stable matching must exist, and we have just seen that maximal matchings that are not maximum matchings cannot be stochastically stable, we can therefore conclude that there exists a maximum matching m that is stochastically stable. Consider any other maximum matching m . Following exactly the same reasoning as above we obtain that the stochastic potential of m must be the same as the stochastic potential of m. Therefore, m is stochastically stable as well. 2
Discussion
In this paper we have considered error models where both link creation and link removal are allowed by mistake. Here we provide a brief discussion for the cases in which the error model allows either link removal only or link creation only, drawing a comparison with the cases dealt with in this paper; this also helps an intuitive understanding of our results.
Suppose that a mistake can only cause an existing link to be removed. Take agents i and j such that ij ∈ g, and consider a matching m where i, j ∈ N(m). We observe that 2 mistakes are required to reach a matching m where i and j are matched together, since both current matches of i and j must be removed. This same result holds if we assume that a mistake can also cause a link to be formed, provided that the agent-error model is used, since both agents prefer not to form the link, so that 2 mistakes are still required. If, instead, we suppose that a mistake can only cause a link to be formed then 1 mistake is enough to have that i and j can be matched together, which is the same that happens if the link-error model is used. We also observe that the reverse passage from m to m requires 1 mistake irrespectively of the error model (it is enough that link ij is removed, which is allowed in any of the error models considered). This argument suggests that in our setting the passage from a matching to another matching with fewer links requires more mistakes then the reverse passage if we use an error model where mistakes can only cause links to be removed, and the same reasoning applies to the agent-error model as well; this intuitively leads to the result that maximum matchings are stochastically stable for both error models. Instead, when we consider either an error model where mistakes can only cause links to be formed, or the link-error model, both passages require 1 mistake, so that intuitively stochastic stability is ineffective for selection purposes.
The above observation facilitates the comparison between our results and similar results in the literature. Indeed, the difference between our findings in case of the agent-error model and the findings in Jackson and Watts (2002) , where only link removal is allowed by mistake, can not driven by the error model, hence it must be driven by agents' preferences. If agents have strict preferences over mates, as it is assumed by Jackson and Watts (2002) , then stochastic stability has no bite for equilibrium selection. If instead, as we assume, each agent has a set of mates with whom he can fruitfully interact, and possible mates are perfect substitutes one of the other (so that agents never change mate intentionally, because of a tiny switching cost), then the role of stochastic stability as an equilibrium selection device is restored, and only maximum matchings are selected. Things are different if we compare our findings in case of the link-error model with those in Klaus et al. (2010) , where only link creation is allowed by mistake: indeed, we can note that here the different assumption on agents' preferences (Klaus et al., 2010 , assume strict preferences as well) does not lead to any significant difference in the stochastic stability analysis, which proves ineffective in both cases as equilibrium selection device.
We think that the stark assumption on agents' preferences that we have used in the model can be a fair approximation in a number of real cases, with the exogenously given graph representing, for instance, skill complementary or geographical proximity. However, our results would be of limited applicability if they crucially rested on agents treating neighbors in the graph as perfect substitutes. Here we will briefly argue how to extend our analysis by relaxing such an assumption. The payoff that agent i earns to trade with agent j, with link ij ∈ g, is now equal to 1 + v ij . Suppose that max ij∈g |v ij | < 1. Suppose also that the cost to be paid to remove a link is c > max ij∈g,ik∈g (v ij − v ik ). Then, once a link is formed, agents would never prefer to remove it to be matched with a better mate, since the benefit is not worth the cost to exit the existing relationship. In such a setting, all our results would be maintained.
Furthermore, we note that in our model, for each agent i, we treat agents who are not possible mates of i as unfeasible, meaning that a link ij / ∈ g can never be formed, even by mistake. We stress that such an assumption is not crucial for our results. Indeed, we can slightly adjust the model to accommodate the case when ij / ∈ g is not unfeasible, but simply worse than remaining unmatched (it is enough to give a negative payoff to both agents if linked together); such unprofitable links will never be formed voluntarily, and if formed by mistake they will be removed as soon as the agents have the opportunity, provided that c is small enough. Our results easily extend to this case as well. Finally, we want to stress that we have made no assumption on the graph describing which links can be formed. This means that our analysis applies if we restrict attention to bipartite graphs, for which a number of specific results are available in the literature, such as the Hall's theorem (Hall, 1935) . In the context of marriage, where agents are divided in two sets, say women and men, the Hall's theorem states that a perfect matching (i.e., a matching where no agent remains uncoupled) exists if and only if the following condition holds: for every subset of women, the set of men who are considered acceptable by at least a woman in the subset is at least as numerous as the subset of women. We conclude by highlighting that we can combine our results with the Hall's theorem, and possibly other theorems for bipartite graphs, to obtain new, potentially interesting, implications. As an example, we note that all and only perfect matchings are stochastically stable in the agent-error model if and only if the condition of the Hall's theorem is satisfied.
